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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

lated by the exclusion order.43 Editors realize
that a scandalous or salacious trial, especially
one involving a wealthy or famous personage,
makes good copy. In their bid to increase
circulation 4 they often delve into minute and
lurid detail, even reproducing the testimony
verbatim. Since newspapers are readily available to all classes of citizens, including the
young and immature, the question of what
restraint, if any, should be placed on such press
coverage requires serious study. It is a problem
in the legislative rather than the judicial sphere
since it involves social and cultural factors
outside the scope of judicial cognizance. 45 The
majority in People v. Jelke recognized this
but were reluctant to accept Section 4 as a
legislative sanction.
CONCLUSION
It is a basic tenent of our judicial system
that an accused shall have the right to a

public trial. 46 This right, however, has never
been considered so inflexible that it cannot be
restricted for good cause. Protecting the innocent and immature from lurid accounts of
depravity is a worthy reason for barring
spectators and the press. The benefits resulting from a public trial are not lost when publicity is withheld from such a small number of
cases. The rights of the accused are adequately
secured in these instances by allowing friends
and relatives of the accused to be present if he
requests it. While Section 4 of the judiciary
law is not a study in exemplary draftsmanship,
it is certainly indicative of a legislative intent
to vest in the trial judge the power to curtail
the publicity attendant to cases of a salacious
nature. Since the evidence which convicted
Jelke was sufficient, his conviction should have
been allowed to stand unless other errors committed during the trial were serious enough to
4
require a reversalY.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Highest Maryland Court Liberalizes Requirement for Admission of Physical Evidence
-Defendant shot and killed X; plea of selfdefense. Defendant testified that X came at
him with a waxer handle and struck him with
it several times. At this time, defendant was
43

Id. at 226, 120 N.Y.S. 2d at 648.
44See White, Newspaper and Radio Coverage of
Criminal Trials: A Modern Dilemma, 41 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 306 (1950).
45
A passage from the majority opinion in the
Jdke case effectively expressed this idea. "We conceive it to be no part of the work of the judiciary
upon the facts here presented to decide what a newspaper prints or to what portion of the people it
caters to sell its papers. A judge may have his personal opinion as to the good taste of what may
appear in public print, but when serving as a judicial
officer he has no right, in a situation such as this, to
restrain or dictate what portion of court proceedings shall be made available for reading by the
public. If abuses exist, they are the proper subject
for correction by the people through constitutional
amendment or by statutory enactment by their
duly elected representatives in the Legislature.
People v. Jelke, 284 App. Div. 211, 230, 130 N.Y.S.
2d 662, 681 (1st Dep't 1954).

wearing a red shirt. An eye witness to the
shooting, produced by the state, testified that
X had not struck defendant with the waxer
handle. The defendant offered the waxer
handle as evidence, but it was rejected by the
trial court. Defendant was convicted of first
degree murder and appealed on the ground
that the rejection of the offered evidence was
reversible error.
Defendant's witness, a biochemist and
micro-biologist, testified that an examination
16If an accused has neither had nor waived a
public trial, it is, in most jurisdictions, reversible
error without any affirmative showing of prejudice.
Tanksley v. United States, 145 F. 2d 58 (9th Cir.
1944); People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 50 N.W.
995 (1891); contra: Reagan v. United States, 202
Fed. 488 (9th Cir. 1913).
4 Excluding the press and public from only the
People's case had no foundation in logic since the
testimony during the defense's case was equally
salacious. The natural tendency here would be to
make the witnesses testify for the prosecution where
they would be shielded from publicity. The court
considered this prejudicial enough in itself to require a new trial.
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of the waxer handle revealed that there was on
the handle waxing material in which was embedded red fibers, identical with the fibers of
the defendant's red shirt, and that there was
waxing material embedded in the fabric of the
defendant's shirt.
At the trial the evidence further showed
that the handle was picked up by an officer
of the criminal investigation department who
placed identifying marks on it. The handle
then stayed in this officer's car for three days.
It was then taken from the officer's car and
placed under the porch of his mother-in-law's
home. The handle was delivered, nineteen
days after the date of the shooting, to the
defense attorney, who delivered it to the above
mentioned biochemist. The red shirt was delivered to the biochemist five days after the
shooting. The trial court ruled out the waxer
handle on the theory that no person had testified that the handle was in the same condition
when it was turned over to the biochemist as
when it was first picked up.
The conviction was reversed and the Maryland Court held that the waxer handle should
have been admitted, for the probability that
third parties may have had access to the handle
while in the officer's car or under the house is
extremely slight and the possibility that red
fibers other than those of the defendant's shirt
could have become embedded in the waxer
handle is so remote that there is no danger in
admitting the handle. Nixoan v. State, 105 A.2d
243 (Md. 1954). (Case note submitted by
Barnard T. Welsh, Attorney of Law, Rockville, Maryland.)
The Plea of Suicide as a Defense to Homocide-In a prosecution for homocide, the state
produced a confession of the defendant stating
that in the course of a scuffle the decedent
fell back against a window and hit her head;
that defendant thinking her dead pulled her
out the window and rolled her over the roof.
The defendant, contending that decedent committed suicide, repudiated the confession and
sought to introduce testimony to the effect that
decedent applied for a job at a restaurant a
week before her death; that she was refused
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the job; that she talked about her past life,
about her being no good, and of her intention
of doing away with herself. This testimony
was excluded by the trial court and the defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in affirming, held the exclusion proper
"because even from the viewpoint most favorable to the defendant, the proffered statement
was too remotely or unreasonably connected
with the events which actually or allegedly
occurred." Commonwealth v. Donmgh, 377 Pa.
46, 103 A.2d 694 (1954).
Although the burden of proof is on the
prosecution to establish the existence of the
crime, evidence of suicide may be persuasive
with the jury in the formation of a reasonable
doubt. The court vests wide discretion with the
trial judge to refuse declarations of intended
suicide (such statements are not hearsay) if
he considers them too remote. It would seem
that objections of remoteness should be relevant to the weight to be accorded the testimony rather than to its admissibility.
Prosecution May Not Eavesdrop on Attorney-Client Conversations during Trial.-Defendants were convicted of murder in the first
degree. They claim that a police officer was
stationed in the courtroom, a few feet from
the counsel table at which they were sitting,
to listen to and report privileged conversations
carried on in Yiddish between them and their
several lawyers. As evidence of this claim, defendants pointed out that the officer attended
the trial in plain clothes and was' the only
individual on the police force who understood
Yiddish. The Court of Appeals of New York
held that defendants had not sustained the
burden of proof on these allegations since the
hearing held after the trial revealed the officer
was present for security purposes only. People
v. Cooper, 307 N. Y. 253, 120 N.E. 2d 813
(1954). The court, however, said that the
right to counsel is inherent in the concept of a
fair trial and includes the right to consult in
private. "If the defendants, upon whom the
burden rested, had proved that Rubin (the
officer) was planted in court with instructions
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to eavesdrop... a new trial would have been
required." "If the defendant, knowing third
persons to be nearby, speaks in such a way as
to indicate that he is not interested in keeping
private what he says.., he will be deemed
to have renounced his right to privacy of
consultation. Not so, however, in a case such
as the present...."
In a separate concurring opinion two justices
took the position that no privileged communications are recognized between attorney
and client which are made in the presence of
third persons who stand in no confidential
relationship.
Husband and Wife May be Convicted of
Conspiring with Each Other-In a case of
first impression in Illinois, the supreme court
ruled that the present statutory law permits a
husband and wife to be convicted for criminal
conspiracy. State v. Martin, 23 U.S.L. Week
2174 (October 19, 1954). The common law
concepts that a wife could not own property
separate from her husband and that neither
spouse was a "person" separate and apart
from the other, formerly prevented such an
action. The court declared that under present
legislation husband and wife may now sue
and be sued in their own rights; each may own
and dispose of property; each may testify
against one another; and that there is no longer
a presumption of coercion of the wife by her
husband. Therefore, "no relevant reason
which might have supported the common-law
rule exists today."
Supreme Court Admits Illegally Obtained
Evidence to Impeach Credibility of a WitnessIn 1950, an indictment against petitioner for
purchasing and possessing one grain of heroin
was dismissed because the capsule had been
obtained through an unlawful search and
seizure. Two years later petitioner was tried
for other narcotic violations; upon direct
examination he denied ever having any dealings
in narcotics. In rebuttal, the government introduced testimony of the officer who had
participated in the 1950 seizure and the chemist who had analyzed the seized capsule. De-

fendant's conviction was upheld by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Walder v. United
States, 74 Sup. Ct. 354 (1954). It has long been
established in the federal courts that illegally
obtained evidence is not admissible into evidence. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a
5-2 Court, concluded that "It is quite another
(thing) to say that the defendant can turn the
existence of such evidence to his own advantage
by using it as a shield against contradiction of
untruth."
The Court distinguished Agnello v. United
States, 209 U. S. 20 (1925), where the government was denied the use of illegally obtained
evidence on cross-examination. There, however, the defendant had made no reference to
the evidence upon direct examination.
Discharge from Military Service Does Not
Terminate Jurisdiction of Military CourtToth was honorably discharged from the United
States Air Force in 1952 after service in Korea.
A year later he was formally charged, pursuant
to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, with
a premeditated murder allegedly committed
in Korea during his term in the military s6rvice.
Thereupon he was apprehended by military
personnel and taken to Korea to await investigation and trial. The district court ordered
his release after a hearing initiated by a writ
of habeas corpus. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed
this determination, holding that the situation
was governed by Article 3(a) of the Uniform
Code which provides that any person subject
to military jurisdiction charged with having
committed a crime punishable by confinement
of at least five years shall not be relieved from
trial by court-martial because of termination
of military status. Talbott v. United States,
215 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1954). That a man is
answerable for a crime at the place and under
the law applicable at the time of the offense,
the court declared to be a familiar concept of
the law. Moreover, since the substance of
Article 3(a) has been in force for some eightyfive years, "it is now too late for any federal
court short of the Supreme Court to do other
than accept the provision as valid." The court
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further held that due process does not require a
preliminary hearing before removal, and that
any such procedure would have to be instituted
by Congress. The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari.
Right to a Speedy Trial-Defendant was
indicted for bribing an alderman and released
on bail. His trial did not begin until two years
after the indictment had been returned. On
appeal, he contended that he had been denied
the right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by
the United States and Wisconsin constitutions.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the
conviction holding in effect that the right had
been waived by inaction. State v. Sawyer, 266
Wisc. 494, 63 N.W. 2d 749 (1954). "While
there is some authority to the contrary, the
general rule is that a demand for trial, resist-
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ance to postponement, or some other effort to
secure a speedy trial must be made by accused
to entitle him to discharge on the ground of
delay, at least when the accused has been
admitted to bail, or is not within the custody
of the court."
Adversary Not Entitled to Examine Trial
Notes-In Witaker v. Blackburn, 23 U.S.L.
Week 2158 (October 12, 1954), the Supreme
Court of Florida held that the prosecution is
not entitled to examine defense counsel's
transcript of an interview with prosecuting
witness even thought the transcript had been
consulted during cross-examination. The court
ruled the transcript to be "simply a private
memorandum of counsel" and "not affected
with a public character". A majority of the
courts have adopted this view.

